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Emp loym ent and Incom e Dist ribu tion Con
strai nts in Lati n Ame rica
Gust av Rani a
Prof esso r of Econ omic s
Yale Univ ersit y

I.

Intro duct ion

It is by now a comm onpla ce to asse rt that
most Lati n Ame rican coun tries
have expe rien ced rath er resp ecta ble per
capi ta incom e grow th rate s over the
past quar ter cent ury but that the perfo
rman ce in the empl oyme nt and incom e
dist ribu tion dime nsio nsha s rema ined "uns
atisf acto ry" and is prob ably wors enin g.
Cert ainl y Lati n Ame rican econ omie s have
thus far prov ided subs tant ial
supp ort for the so-c alle d "Kuz nets law"
that incom e dist ribu tion must
get wors e befo re it gets bett er in the
cour se of rapi d grow th, on a
coun try- spec ific hist oric al rath er than
simp ly mul ti-co untr y cros s
sect iona l basi s. Why is this so and can
anyt hing be done abou t it-
in the ligh t of our pres ent unde rstan ding
of deve lopm ent proc esse s and
of the spec ific Lati n Ame rican real ity?
The firs t issu e whic h need s to be addr esse
d, or at leas t disp osed
of, is that equi ty and empl oyme nt outco
mes are perh aps not real ly
"uns atisf acto ry" from the poin t of view
of the elit es in cont rol of
most of the coun tries in the regi on-- and
that it is in thei r inte rest ,
and in the inte rest of thei r alli es outs
ide who supp ort them , to pay
lip serv ice to the purs uit of "new " deve
lopm ent obje ctiv es the bett er
to enab le ever yone to purs ue "bus ines s
(i.e . grow th) as usua l." Ther e
is litt le poin t in spec ulat ing
.
. ts " an d"b
a b out " cons train
o stac1 es I I •in
the way of ame liora ting perfo rman ce on
empl oyme nt and dist ribu tion al
gron nds if we are inde ed deal ing only with
rhet oric al devi ces on the
part of inte rnat iona l agen cies , Lati n Ame
rican pres iden ts and opin ion
mak ers in the adva nced coun tries .
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While few would assert with confidence that we can count on a
straightforw ard, underlying desire to change the status of the Latin
American unemployed or poor, either absolutely or relatively, in all
of the "governing circles" of either the DC's and LDC's involved, we
will assume that there exists a reasonable interest in redressing
extreme imbalances --if it can be done at a "reasonable ' cost in terms
of more traditional national (and individual) objectives.

The question

of constraints to improved employment and equity thus comes down to
the extent of trade-offs among objectives and of how they can be softened.
While the assessment of what level of trade-offs is acceptable and
what level is not is, of course, closely related to the above issue
of "who governs" and "who speaks," we will in this paper abstract
from the cynical notion, held by many on the left, that we are engaged
here only in national and internation al charades enacted to gain time.
What does that leave us with?

I would argue that it leaves us with

a clear obligation to examine the nature of these trade-offs on the Latin
American scene and to present policy-make rs on both sides with as much
theoretical structure and as much historical and •cross sectional evidence
on these issues as we possibly can muster.

Now it may still be true, as

Dr. Prebish pointed out some years ag~ that more rapid growth along the
same tracks on which Latin America-has been travelling in the past can
yield a solution to the employment, if not
problem.

necessarily the equity

But I hope that even he would admit today that the fuel

(no pun intended) for doubling growth rates and thus "pulling" the
unemployed and tmderemploy ed into productive activity without a change
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in structure is not likely to be forthcoming except perhaps in such
special cases as Venezuela.
1
The World Bank, especially Selowsky,. on the other hand, sometimes

sound as if the problem of equity, if not of unemployment, can be
solved via fiscal redistribution after the fact.

But even he seems

recently to have become more sanguine about the limits to Latin American
fiscal and administrative capacity which would surely be tested by
any effort to "redistribute from growth."

If neither the Latin American

"growth locomotive" or its taxes and transfer payments are likely to
solve the problem over time it becomes necessary to examine what can
be achieved by possible changes in the way in which growth itself is
now being generated.

This paper, in fact, starts with the basic

assumption that growth, employment and distributional outcomes theoreti
cally can be and, for policy reasons must be, tackled simultaneously.
At worst, we may discover that explicit hard choices have to be made
between,say, reductions in the Gini and per capita income growth.

At

best, we may find ourselves in the more pleasurable circumstances of
devising strategies which permit Latin America's locomotives to move
out on new tracks.

It is only in this way that the existence of trade

offs among desirable objectives, and of the possible alleviation of
such trade-offs, can be analyzed.
In attempting to tackle this problem in.the Latin American
context we are, of course, painfully aware that there is no such thing
as "the" Latin American economy, not even "the" Latin American semiindustrial country.

Nevertheless, by concentrating on the latter

subset which includes, inter alia, Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia,
we perhaps commit a lesser crime from a typological point of view.
~- Selowsky, "Balancing Trickle Down and Basic Needs Strategies:
Income Distribution Issues in Large Middle-Income Cotmtries with Special
Reference to Latin America", World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 353, 1979 •
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What these economies seem to have in common is, relative to other
relevant NIC's, i.e. of the East Asian variety, a strong natural
resources base, inferior but a still fairly good human resources
endowment, and a lesser pressure of population on the land, but with
still. substantial pockets of labor surplus.

These systems have gen

erally exhibited annual growth rates of 6% and above, manufacturing
growth rates of 15% to 20% or more, but with unemployment and under
employment, if admittedly difficult to measure, substantial and
probably rising, and with Gini coefficients (or some other measure
of income distribution equity) typically hovering at the upper
extreme of international experience, and worsening over the past
two decades.
The task we have set ourselves in this paper is to examine the
"causes" of what appears to be this unhappy historical conflict between
growth, on the one hand, and unemployment and the distribution of
income, on the other, in "the" Latin American case.

In the course of

this effort we hope to be able to distinguish elements of the causal
explanation which are related to given"initial conditions" and those
which are subject to flexibility, either in terms of economic or
political options.

We will, moreover, find it helpful not only to uti-

lize the Latin .American historical laboratory but also that of the East
Asian NIC's which have apparently managed to eliminate their tmemployment
problem and improve their distribution of income in the course of rapid
growth during the same quarter century.

Our full awareness of important

differences among Latin American countries is complemented by less well
known differences among the East Asian NIC' s (the "Gang of Four").

Our
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discussion will thus deal mainly with Colombia and Mexico as prototypes
of the Latin American NIC's and with Taiwan as the prototype of the
East Asian NIC's.

We do this in the full realization of the existence

of important differences among members of each type--and in the even
fuller realization that inter-country comparisons, even when qualified
carefully in terms of intra vs inter-type argmnents, are often not
particularly well received.

The reason we persevere is three-fold;

one, the East Asian NIC's happen to be the only group of LDC's which
seem to have succeeded in avoiding the crucial Kuznets curve trade-off
among development objectives; two,we believe that comparative analy
tical history which is typology-sensitive should raise fewer hackles than
SO-country cross-sectional studies which usually are not; three, because
in the end, given our imperfect science, all one can do in pursuit of
the elusive truth is to offer causal suggestions rather than tight
proofs as to which elements of the analytical web might or might not
be more generally relevant, and leave it to the reader to come to his
own conclusions.
In Section II we propose to sketch in the contrasting initial
conditions in the Latin American and East Asian proto-typical NIC cases,
at the

ttarting gate 9 so to speak and to briefly describe the divergent

path growth has taken since in the two cases.

Section III will examine

the causal relationship between the nature of the growth path and the
employment and income distribution performance.

Section IV will present

a brief summary of our conclusions with respect to the existing constraints
on improved employment and equity performance in the Latin American NIC's.
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II.

Initial Conditio ns and Growth Phases
As we pointed out above, ignoring importan t typolog ical differen ces

at the starting gate would make it extreme ly difficu lt to analyze contras t
ing subsequ ent growth and employm ent/equit y outcomes in any meaning ful
fashion.

The "typical " Latin American NIC, some amalgam of Colombi a,

Mexico and Brazil, started its transiti on growth effort from a very
differen t initial base than that encounte red by the typical East
Asian NIC, some amalgam of Taiwan and Korea.

The Latin American LDC' s,

first of all, began their effort at transiti on growth substan tially
earlier , i.e. in the mid-30s and largely as an unintend ed by-prod uct of
policies designed mainly to provide balance of payments insulati on
from the internat ional- impact of the Great Depressi on.

This has had

the conseque nce of a much longer growth experien ce of a particu lar
type and a longer time for sectora l interest clashes to harden into
encruste d bargain s which tend to reduce a system's

economic and

p9litic al flexibi lity and its ability to exploit underlyi ng comple
mentari ties among developm ental objectiv es.
A second importan t distingu ishing charact eristic is the differen t
nature of the colonia l heritage as seen in, say, Colombia and, say, Taiwan.
In one case, we have a Spanish colonial • experien ce focussin g heavily on
extracti ve primary export activiti es within a preassig ned scheme of the
interna tional division of labor; in the other, Japanese colonial ism
focussed instead on the agricul tural food producin g sector at an early
stage mainly because the colonia l goods happened to be rice and sugar,
instead of precious metals and tobacco.

The workings of a "vent for

surplus" type of export orientat ion means a good deal less attentio n is
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paid early to both the physical and organizational infrastructure in
the rural areas.
Thirdly, the typical Latin American case, Mexico and Colombia
included, is generally better endowed with both arable land and related
natural resources and much less subject to the heavy labor surplus con
ditions initially encountered in Asia.

On the other hand, while Latin

America's entrepreneuria l and other hmnan resources compare favorably
with those of most LDC's, it is fair to say that East Asia's overall
educational heritage is generally viewed as superior to
that of the typical Latin American case.

Moreover, the average size

of the typical Latin American NIC is somewhat larger, thus, ceteris
paribus, the potential role of international trade somewhat smaller.
All LDC's, the world's NIC's in the forefront, can be said to
have been engaged in more or less serious efforts at achieving transi
tion from agrarianism to modem growth in the Kuznets tradition
over the past quarter century.

While they thus start this effort

with substantially different historical constraints and possibilitie~
it is by now a fairly well accepted notion that their transition path
is likely to move through a series of more or less continuous and
gradually changing subphases.

These represent a combination of natural

progressions and changing policy packages which accommodate changes
in the underlying economic conditions--or fail to quickly enough,as
the case may be.

A quick

review of the sub-phasing encountered in

the two sets of NIC's will lay important additional

groundwork for

our analysis of the underlying nature of the constraints on better
employment and income distribution performance in the Latin American
case.

-8The initial sub-phase of transition is the well-know n primary
import substitut ion pattern, with tradition al land-base d exports
financing producer goods imports assigned to the gradually increased
domestic productio n of previousl y imported consumer non-durab les.
In the Latin American NIC's this sub_-phase , begun in the 1930's,
generally ran out of steam around the early 1950s as domestic markets
for these non-durab le consumer goods gradually became exhausted
and the rate of growth of industria l output began to decline.

_The

East Asian NIC experienc e, starting later, presents a more or less
faithful mirror image (see line 1, table 1) with two important observed
differenc es, i.e. a milder version of infant industry protection ism
and, given the colonial heritage, a rural sector much less neglected
in relative terms than was true in the Latin American case.
When primary import substitut ion ends, however, a new expansion
path clearly has to be found--an d here a major divergenc e between the
two types of NIC's may be observed.

In the typical LDC dualistic

economy setting there are basically two options readily available :
one is to maintain the essential ingredien ts of the import substitut ion
policy syndrome which by now is too well known to require further
elaborati on--but shift attention from non-durab le consumer goods to
the productio n,primari ly for the domestic market initially and for
internati onal markets later~of capital goods, consumer durables and
the processin g of intermedi ate goods.

This sub-phase may be labelled

secondary import substitut ion/expo rt promotion , i.e. the system continues
to rely mainly on tradition al land-base d exports to fuel the productio n
for domestic markets (and increasin gly to subsidize industria l exports)
of more capital and technolog y intensive goods.

The other option is to
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give a new lease of life to the non-durable consumer goods industries
which, having benefitted from initial protection in domestic markets,
may now be ready to be turned loose on international markets--with the
help of some key changes in the policy setting.

Its success requires

not only lower levels of effective protection for industry and a greater
market orientation generally but also a continuation of the prior policy
of rural sector-oriented investments, and the maintenance of a fairly
equal distribution of assets, via land reform.

This choice may be called

export substitution, i.e. the gradual substitution of traditional land
based by non-traditional unskilled labor based industrial exports.
Clearly the changing resources flow structure as well as the policy
packages which accommodate it are generally too complicated to fit
neatly into these idealized categories, i.e. every developing country
represents a complicated mixture of many tendencies; moreover demarcations
between historical subphases are always blurred by a good deal of pulling
and hauling and contradictory policies at any one point in time.

Never

theless, it is approximately true that an important shift must take place
at the end of primary import substitution.
With these caveats in mind, we may assert that the Latin American
NIC's had a tendency to shift directly to a secondary import substitution
regime in the 1950s, while the East Asian NIC's had a tendency to shift
first towards a labor intensive industrial export substitution phase,
before moving, in the 70's, towards secondary import substitution and
export substitution (notice not export promotion, about which distinction
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more later).

We believe that the apparently larger trade-off or conflict

between growth (see rows 4 and 6) and employment cum equity (see rows 11
and 12) in the Latin American, than the East Asian, case has much to do
with this differential societal choice, i.e. the skipping of the unskilled
labor fuelled primary export substitution phase.

In what follows we hope

to establish some prima facie causal relationships in support of this
notion.

Moreover, the focus of our attention will be on the economic and

political reasons for the choices made in the Latin American case in the
past and, perhaps more relevant, on the choices currently available.

III.

Divergent Growth Paths, Employment and Equity.
Any fuller discussion of the effects of past policy choices and/or

of the policy options facing Latin American NIC's today must, of course,
be based on a causal analysis linking the growth path chosen with a
system's employment cum equity performance.

In an economy in which the

agricultural sector continues to have a heavy weight and in which open
urban unemployment is dwarfed by substantial rural underemployment, it
is essential to try to differentiate between rural and urban households,
both with respect to the spatial dimension of economic activity and dis
tributional outcomes.

Urban families are basically eµgaged in industrial

and service activities generating mainly wage and property incomes.

Rural

families, on the other hand, are engaged in both agricultural activities
generating a merged agricultural income and non-agricultural activites
generating wage and property income.
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We will find it useful, moreover, to utilize a specific analytical
device to link output, employment and income distribution behaviorally, i.e.
by _ decomposing the overall family distribution of income in any of our
representative cases into the distribution of each of the major components
of family income (i.e., agricultural, non-agricultural wages, non
agricultural property, etc.), weighted by the importance of each of these
in the total income (i.e., the ftmctional relative shares).

1 In other

words, if we use the Gini coefficient G as a SUDmlary measure of the size
y

distribution, it can be defined approximately as:

where Gw, GTI, and GA represent the Ginis of wage, property and agricultural
income, respectively,

and ¢w' ¢TI and ¢A

and agricultural income.

the relative shares of wage, property

Thus, a given factor component usually contri-

butes more heavily to overall inequality, the higher its inequality and
the higher its share.
Applying this notion to non-agricultural income only, any change in
total income equality through time may be written as:
dG
_:t.

dt

=

(G - G )d¢ /dt + ¢ (dG /dt) + ¢ (dG /dt)
w
TI
w
TI
TI
w
w
Functional
Distribution
Effect

1

Factor
Gini
Effect

This is an over-simplification explained more fully in "Growth and
the Family Distribution of Income by Factor Components," G. Ranis, J. Fei,
S. Kuo, Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1978. For a full treatment
of Gini decomposition analysis see Growth With Equity: The Taiwan Case,
G. Ranis, J. Fei, S. Kuo, Oxford University Press, December 1979.
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i.e. it is determined by two types of forces, which we may label the flll1ctional
distribution effect and the factor Gini effect.

The former focuses on a

change in the functional shares, the latter on a change in the distribution of any component factor. income.

If the wage share gains over time

at the expense of the property share, such a change will obviously favor
overall equality if and only if wage income is more equally distributed
than property income.

This is the way the functional shares can be linked

to the size distribution of income.

an
Since, in fact, Gw is usually <G,
7f

increase in labor's functional share will always help the overall size distribution of income.

Secondly, since a decline in the Gini of any factor

will contribute to a decline in the overall Gini--in proportion to the
weight of that factor--the direction of the factor Gini effect is also
clear.

The trend of the factor Ginis themselves requires knowledge

concerning changes in the ownership pattern of human and capital resources,
via formal or informal education, and saving behavior plus asset redistribution.
Moreover, since we are dealing with dualistic economies,we should
consider at least three types of income, agricultural as well as non
agricultural wage and non-agricultural property income.

This adds a

( where NA stands for all non-agricultural
dt
1
This means that if
income), which we may call the reallocation effect.
third effect, (GA - GNA)dcpA/

agricultural income is more (less) equally distributed than non-agricultural
income, any decline in the agricultural income share will clearly contribute
to greater (lesser) overall inequality.

Since, in the context of success

ful dualistic development, we expect cpA to decline as labor is reallocated
½he full equation becomes a bit more complicated, but nothing is
fnndamentally altered. See Fei, Ranis and Kuo, op cit. Note the Factor
Gini Effect also has the additional argument ~A (dGA/dt).
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from agricultural to non-agri_cultural pursuits, the relative magnitudes of GA
and GNA will determine the nature of the impact of the reallocation effect
on the overall Gini.
In this way changes in the overall Gini can be analyzed, both quali
tatively and quantitatively, in terms of three "effects" which are tied
to such growth related phenomena as labor's share (the fllllctional dis
tribution effect), the relative importance of agriculture in the dualistic
economy (the reallocation effect), as well as to changes in the inequality
of various factor incomesthemselves (the factor Gini effect).

All this

provides us with a framework for reasoning about the causal linkages
between growth, employment and equity in the typical Latin American as
well as East Asian NIC's in different sub-phases of their transition
growth effort.
In what follows we shall try to establish some of the reasons for
these observed differences by tracing the differential impact of the
three kinds of effects we have identified--which are in turn related
to differences in the underlying type of growth performance of the two
types of NIC's

over time.

Since the data base for the two Latin American

cases is not as good as that for Taiwan we will not be in a position to
fully implement our decomposition formula but will have to contend
ourselves with more suggestive or casual comparative empirical evidence.
Let us first examine the comparative impact of the fllllctional
distribution effect on the overall Gini.

Clearly, as long as non

agricultural wage income is more equally distributed than non-agricultural
property

income, i.e. G

w

<

G .--which does hold, as we would expect it
11''
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to, in all cases and at all times-- the higher labor's share cf, w , the lower
the level of the overall Gini,and the more it is rising the more likely is
the Gini to decline--all ceteris paribus, of course.
In the case of Colombia, labor's relative share in urban industry
and services seems to lie between .35 and .411 without much movement.
during the 1960's.

Taiwan's urban non-agricultural wage share is sub

stantially higher and rising gradually during the decade reaching .60
I

by the early 1970's.

This would seem to give a substantial'advantage"to

the East Asian case. Equally telling is the rise in the relative share of
labor in the rural industries and services of the East Asian NIC's,
i.e. from .21 in 1964 to .42 by 1972, while in the Colombian case,
if of much less quantitative importance, we note a decline from .38
to .24 between 1950 and 1975.

We may thus conclude that the functional distribution effect
favored a more equal distribution of income, absolutely and over
time, in the East Asian case.

Labor's relative share, in turn, can

be traeed to a more labor intensive industrial growth path, both
in terms of static technology choices, the nature of the output mix
and the

direction

of technology change.

The evidence (see Table 1

Row 8) indicates that given labor surplus conditions during the 1960' s
real wages did not rise very much in the East Asian case but somewhat
more in Latin America.

However, the East Asian NIC's' dramatic movement

into labor-intensive industrial export substitution (compare the 1960
and 1975 figures in rows 2 and 3) permitted a much more rapid rate of
labor absorption and, via the functional distribution effect, the achieve
ment of a much more equitable distribution of income (lower Gini) (see
row 11).
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We are not in a position to make a similar type of statement
about the comparative contribution of the functional distribution
effect in the earlier,primary import substitution sub-phase of growth.
However, since nature does not "make jumps", the relatively "milder"
set of import substitution policies generally pursued in East Asia
probably made a contribution to the relatively greater reduction of
income inequality in the SO's.

At the end of the sixties, the East

Asian NIC's, having expanded their labor-intensive industrial exports
at a furious rate (see rows 2 and 3), had exhausted their unskilled

labor surplus and beg~n to encounter rapidly rising real wage~ for
the first time.

This, as we would expect, represents a significant

milestone along the transition growth path and is marked by the even
stronger positive contribution of the functional distribution effect,
i.e. it represents a milestone along the income distribution path as well.
In the absence of the elimination of the unemployment/wderemployment
conditions in the Latin American NIC's we observe no equivalent
marked improvement in income distribution equity in Colombia or
Mexico in the seventies (see row llJ.
The fact that the advent of "full employment" has significance
for growth as well as equity, of cours~,. represents encouraging
support to our overall thesis.

But much the more significant part

of the story is that the societal choice of an export substitution
growth phase can render rapid growth compatible with an improvement-
or at least non-deterioration--of income distribution equity, long
before real wages begin to rise in a sustained fashion.

This is
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because,cotmte r to what both Arthur Lewis and Simon Kuznets casually
assumed ,low wage rates are compatible with an increased wage share
as poor families have more members employed, working more hours
per week.
The next quantitatively most powerful influence on the level
and direction of change of the overal Gini resides in the reallocation
effect, summarized in the third term presented above.

It indicates

that since any successfully growing developing economy is bound to
be gradually shifting its center of gravity from agriculture to
non-agriculture ,

is bound to be negative. Whether or not
dqiA
dt
this effect helps or hurts income distribution equity depends on

whether or not rural households' (merged) agricultural income is more
equally distributed than their (merged) non-agricultura l income, i.e.
on the relationship between GA and GNA'

As

long as GA is larger than

GNA' the anticipated gradual shift from agricultural income (the less
equally distributed) to non-agricultura l income (the more equally dis
tributed) clearly helps, ceteris paribus,to reduce the overall Gini.
Turning to the empirical side, in the case of the East Asian NIC' s,
rural families' agricultural income was generally less equally distri
buted than their non-agricultur al income; moreover the share of non
agricultural income in total income was both large and rapidly rising-
together contributing to the overall improvement of the distribution
of income.

Specifically, in Taiwan the GA forruralhouseh olds ranged

from .35 in the mid-60's to .30 in the early 70's, with their total
income Gini ranging from .31 to .28 (i.e. their non-agricultur al Ginis
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were indeed lower than their agricultural Ginis); moreover, the share
of non-agricultural income in the total income of rural households
rose from 32% in 1964 to a truly remarkable 53% in 1971.

The Latin

American family survey data available to us tmfortunately do not
permit a differentiation between the agricultural and non-agricultural
components of rural family incomes and it is therefore impossible to
differentiate between the equality of the distribution of each of these
flows.

We may, with reasonable certainty, deduce, however, that if in

Taiwan, given its small family holdings, its extensive land reform,
its virtual absence of landless workers and its strong farmer association
structure, rural industries and services income is more equally dis
tributed than agricultural income, this is even more likely to be true
in Colombia which has had no extensive land reform, has a much more
unequal distribution of land, as well as a relatively large number of
landless agricultural workers.
With respect to the importance of the total non-agricultural
income share in total rural family income, however, we have evidence
for Colombia, for example, indicating

that it is relatively low

and probably declining, i.e. (see row 9) from 14% to 9% over two decades.
This contrast is extremely important for two related reasons: one,
it indicates the extent to which rural non-agricultural activity (i.e.
rural industry and services) played a role in the industrial export
substitution sub-phase of the East Asian NIC's; and, two, that the
high and rising labor intensity of these activities (absolutely and
relative to their Latin cotmterparts) permitted a dramatic absorption
of the rural unemployed and underemployed.

Independent evidence, moreover,
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indicates that even in the 50's it was the smaller or landless farmers
who participated proportionally more actively in these non-agricultural
activities, thus contributing to the overall equalization of rural
household incomes.

But it was the remarkable, and growing, importance of

a decentralized, labor-intensive industry and services sector--which
incidentally (and surprisingly) grew even faster than its urban counter
part in the Taiwan of the 60's--which was instrumental in making the
reallocation effect a powerful instrument for eliminating the conflict
between growth and equity in this East Asian NIC.
Finally let us turn to the impact of the factor Gini effect, the
final term in our decomposition equation.

Empirically speaking, we

may note that the main contribution to a lower overall Gini here, in
the case of the East Asian >rural households, was provided via a
reduction of the agricultural income Gini GA over time, from approxi
mately .54 in 1953 to .35 in 1964 and .30 in 1972. 1
In

other words, while agricultural income is, as we have seen,

less equally distributed across families than non-agricultural income,
the degree of inequality has been falling.

This, in the case of the

East Asian NIC's, is due to the direct and indirecteffects of land
reform, combined with the introduction, especially in Taiwan, of multi
ple cropping,with secondary food crops, such as mushrooms and asparagus,
more labor-intensive than traditional
importance.

sugar and rice,increasing in

The land distribution Gini for Taiwan is .59 in contrast to

.85 in Colombia (see row 13).

Moreover, Colombia's agricultural output

1while we do not have adequate data for the Latin American case,
to be more powerful here, as a
we would expect an increasing dG
w

dt

negative influence due to the greater role of union-supported labor
aristocracies in the Latin American case.
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mix has shifted from traditional domestically oriented food crops, i.e.
beans, plantain and cassava, for which labor makes up 40% of direct costs,
to commercial export crops, i.e. cotton, soya and sugar, for which labor
accounts for only 18%--just the oppo·site direction of what was encountered
in the East Asian case.
Our ability to isolate the various components of overall income
distribution change and to link them to other, growth-related phenomena
in these two types of NIC's has permitted us, in this fashion, to pin
point the reasons for the existence of apparently larger conflicts or
trade-offs in the Latin American case.

It remains for us to briefly

StnllIIlarize our findings and to inquire as to their relevance to the
contemporary Latin American scene.

IV.

Swmnary and Conclusions
In summary, then, the East Asian NIC's seem to have benefitted

from initial conditions and policies which gave early attention to
the rural economy, entailing

both less neglect

than "normal" for

food producing agriculture via land reform and terms of trade main
tenance as well as a strategy of decentralized industrializati on
during the primary import substitution sub-phase.

Subsequently, we

noted that the liberalization measures of the early 60's permitted a
shift to an

export substitution. strategy which yielded rapid export

oriented growth combined with massive increases in employment and
the ultimate termination of the labor surplus condition, ushering in
secondary importand export substitution in the 70's.
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In contrast, the Latin American NIC's may be said to have had less
favorable initial conditions, to have pursued a more urban industry-oriented
strategy during their primary import substitution phase, and to have
moved directly from primary to secondary import substitution during the
SO's and 60's.

In more recent years this syndrome may be said to have been

complemented by a strategy of export promotion which encourages industrial exports via selective subsidization or other direct actions
without major change in the overall protective structure granted
domestic industry.
The really important question, of course, is to what extent Latin
Americans should consider the divergent East Asian experience as
at all relevant to their own contemporary problems.
breaks down into two related issues:

This, in turn

to what extent has the Latin

American performance been an inevitable consequence of her initial
conditions and to what extent of perverse policies; and two, depending
on the response to that,what,if anything, can be done today by those
desirous to lift man-made constraints on better equity performance.
We will,in conclusion,

briefly attempt to address, if not answer,

this question.
Societies, like individuals, "do what comes naturally;"accordingly
it should be no great surprise that Colombia, Mexico and Brazil whose
development has been historically bia:ie::l towards such natural resource
exports as gold, coffee and minerals, should have continued to rely
heavily on primary exports in the course of their transition growth.
This translates into both a relative neglect of food producing agriculture
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and of the potential full utilization of unskilled human resources, as
the society is able to keep financing a more and more costly type of
import substitution industrialization at the end of her primary import sub
stitution •

Such a prolongation of import substitution or the "skipping" of

a labor intensive primary export substitution phase is really made possible
by the larger availability of natural resources--both by way of a
relative "natural" overvaluation of exchange rates, and the assist of
trade and domestically oriented intervention policies tending in the
same direction.

More natural resources and/or more foreign capital

inflows clearly can be used to help ease the transition from one
policy regime to another; just as easily they can be used to avoid
unpleasant (at least for some interest groups) changes in the

nature

of the growth path.
In the case of the East Asian NIC's the problem was in a sense
easier; just as in Japan at an earlier date, the agricultural sector
could be viewed as a temporary (and important) fuelling device, but
the system's long run comparative advantage had to be found elsewhere,
i.e. in the human resources area, first unskilled then skilled.

The

"natural" rate of exchange was not likely to be overvalued by "vent
for surplus" commodities and predictably diminishing primary exports
and, in the long term unreliable, foreign capital inflows had to be
utilized so as to ease the transition towards more competitive export
oriented growth regimes.
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The extent to which the "skipping" of the primary export sub
stitution phase in Latin America represents a politically convenient
maneuver of the.elite,or a resources- dictated necessity constitutes a
moot point.

It is made more moot by the fact that actual NIC experienc~

whether Latin American or East Asi<111 is by no means as monolithic
or clear-cut as described here.

Societies move in ambiguous paths

lurching in one direction one day, backing in another direction the
next, yielding shades of gray, rather than the more extreme demarcations

we have used here,for purposes of effect and illustration.

Korea's performance, especially post-1968,for example, containsas
many elements of export promotion as of export substitution--witness
the setting of individual firm export quotas and .the relative neglect
of food producing agriculture

1

Brazil's performance, on the other

hand, especially between 1963 and 1973, contained as many elements
of export substitution,yielding a burst in shoe and other labor
intensive exports, as of export promotion.
What may be viewed as some sort of rough convergence between Korea,
the leastsuccessful (in our terms) of.the East Asian NIC's,and Brazil,
the most successful Latin American NIC,should also give us some notion
as to the policy options open to the contemporary Latin American case.
In brief, there would appear to be

nothing irreversible about any

"ideal" sequence of transition phasing or irretrievable about opportunities
foregone.

In other words,greater attention to land reform and agri

cultural productivity increase coupled with rural industrialization and

¾or a fullerdiscussion of the divergence between Korea and
Taiwan see "A Model of Growth and Employment in the Open
Dualistic Economy: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan," G. Ranis and J. Fei
Journal of Development Studies, Jan~ary 1975. (Reprinted in Employment
Income Distribution and Development, Frances Stewart, ed., Frank Cass & Co.,
London, 1975. )
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shifts towards more labor intensive technolggies and output mixes
generally can be achieved at any point in time.

The most recently

announced policy changes in Brazil,if vigorously pursued,represent
an example; they should permit the mopping up of substantial pockets
of underemployed labor, including in the North-East.
This doesn't mean, of course, that the length of time typical
secondary import substitution policies have been pursued is irrelevant
to the ability to revers_!:! them.

Vested interests encrusted in pro

tectionist hot-houses since the 1930's are more likely to be resistant
to the kind of policy changes we have been discussing.

The discovery

of additional natural resources and/or a boom in raw material prices
make it all the more tempting to postpone any potentially unpleasant
changes in structure.
capital.

The same is true of easy access to foreign

1

And there exist other arguments against policy reversal, e.g. to
the effect that the East Asian NIC's were special cases, with especially
favored access to DC capital and markets, and that the contemporary
global trend towards protectionism will especially affect the LDC's
export substitution/DC' s 'sunset" industries, rendering the East Asian
NIC strategy obsolete.

There is, moreover, little point in denying

that the international trading world has become less open in recent
years and that this trend is ominous for all sorts of reasons, including

1

As Fishlow put it most recently ("Brazilian Development in Long-term
Perspective", American Economic Review, May 1980) "favorable and new
access to capital markets that contributed to earlier growth has sub
sequently facilitated inappropriate economic policies that now bind
further options."
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its effect on the transition growth efforts of contemporary Latin .Ameri
can NIC's. Yet one can also read the historical record, e.g. Taiwan's,
as one of overcoming substantial disadvantages, including a much
worse natural

resources base, successive major political upheavals,

followed by the continuous drain of high defense expenditures and
partial international isolation; and, far from favored trade treatment
by the DC's, one of being the subject of increasingly severe quota
restrictions.
The fact that the East Asian NIC's were apparently able in recent
years to weather the multiple punches of increased protectionism, oil
crisis and global stagflation is testimony to the flexibility which the
alternative growth sequence entails.

It should, moreover, not be lost

on the Latin .American NIC's that, now that the original "Gang of Four"
has graduated from primary export substitution into the "promised land"
of secondary import cum export substitution, other countries in the
region, most prominently Malaysia and possibly Indonesia--eventually even
the Philippines--m~y be turning to fill the primary export substitution
niche in world trade.

This niche is, of course, not of limited size

but expandable in terms of trade among LDC's as well in filling SITC
"holes" in the trade with the advanced countries.
In the final analysis, the basic issue is whether various Latin
.American NIC interest groups can be persuaded that a change in direction
may be in their own longer term interest.

The ability to persuade

industrialists, for example, that a switch to export substitution in
dustries will provide larger profits on expanded volume than export
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promot ion efforts on smalle r volumes helped by negotia ted subsid ies
depend s on the extent of workab ly compet itive pressur es the system
is
really willing to expose them to--as it does on the extent to which
the civil service is willing to share some of its direct negotia tion
and contro l power, and organiz ed sector labor to substit ute working
family income over wages as an objecti ve.

The accepta nce or rejecti on

of technic al argume nts on how the constra ints to better employm ent
and equity perform ance with more (rather than less) growth can be
weaken ed must clearly be the first order of busine ss; but there will
still remain the domest ic politic al economy or "reform -monge ring"
issues of how to get there.
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